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This paper examines how the close ties between banks and non-banking firms—the so-called 
“organ bank” relationship in Japanese banking literature—declined through bank failures and 
banking consolidations in pre-war Japan. With a unique dataset compiled from 1,007 Japanese banks 
that were doing business between 1926 and 1936, we measure the degree of the “organ bank” 
relationship by the number of people who worked as directors or auditors for both a bank and a 
non-banking firm at the same time. We found that the number of “interlocking directors” declined in 
our sample period, when there were many bank failures and bank mergers and acquisitions. 
Furthermore, the remaining interlocked directors, after the wave of bank failures and consolidations, 
no longer demonstrated negative effects on the performance of the banks, as measured by their 
profitability. Our findings suggest, based on experience in Japan, that banking consolidations and 
selection through failure may help eliminate the detrimental connections between banks and 
non-banking firms. 
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  1 
1 Introduction 
  The financial system in pre-war Japan has long been characterized by the fact that a 
number of banks had close relationships with non-banking companies. Those banks are called 
“organ banks,” the original meaning of which is a bank that acts as a tool for related 
non-banking companies. Organ banks played an important role in raising funds for their related 
industrial firms. However, the literature has stressed that loans organ banks made to their related 
group tended to be used for unsound projects, and as a result, they were frequently defaulted on, 
which in turn damaged the banks’ performance.
1    
  Meanwhile, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese banking sector experienced a 
significant structural change due to a wave of bank failures and mergers and acquisitions. The 
total number of private banks declined from its peak of 2,334 in 1901 to 65 by 1945. The most 
rapid decline happened in the period between 1920 and 1932, when, due to a sequence of 
financial crises, government policies promoted banking consolidations. 
  What happened to organ bank relationships during the period of banking consolidation 
in pre-war Japan? According to our data, the connections between banks and non-banking 
companies faded as a result of banking consolidation, both in terms of the number of 
connections and the negative effects of these connections on bank performance. In other words, 
we observe the fall of the “organ bank” relationship during the wave of bank consolidations.   
  This observation comes from a dataset we compiled from 1,007 Japanese banks that 
were doing business between 1926 and 1936, consisting of major accounting variables, such as 
total assets, total deposits, security holdings, return on equity, etc., as well as information such 
as the time of a failure or a merger or acquisition event. It also includes information on bankers’ 
                                                        
1 See Kato (1957), Takahashi and Morigaki (1968), Ishii (1999), Imuta (2002), and 
Okazaki, Sawada and Yokoyama (2005), for example.   
  2personnel ties with non-banking companies. As for the information on personnel ties, we 
measure the degree of the connections banks had with non-banking companies through the 
number of “director interlocks,” defined as the number of instances in which a bank director or 
auditor served as a director or auditor of a related non-banking company at the same time. Our 
empirical analysis shows that banking consolidation reduced the number of director interlocks. 
With respect to small banks in particular, the number of interlocks per bank, as well as per 
director, declined during our sample period. The number of director interlocks declined faster 
for the banks that experienced consolidation. Furthermore, in addition to the decline in the 
number of interlocks, the quality of the interlocks changed. We confirmed that the negative 
effect of interlocks on the banks’ profitability, measured by returns on equity, diminished over 
our sample period, and that this change was only observed in the banks that experienced 
consolidations. 
  Our empirical study, using pre-war Japanese banking data, addresses the question of 
the impact of banking consolidation on the bank-firm relationship. There is already a vast body 
of literature on the impact of banking consolidation, but our study distinguishes itself from the 
others with a new focus on how the personal ties between banks and non-banking firms changed 
because of the consolidations. The studies closest to ours might be the analysis of the impact of 
banking consolidation on the supply of credit to small business borrowers, represented by 
Berger et al. (1998). Empirical studies on small business lending in the United States generally 
explore loan-level data and investigate how banking consolidation changes the allocation of 
loan portfolios. We could not find loan-level data for pre-war Japanese banks, but we have data 
on the personal connections of the directors of banks and non-banking firms, and there was a 
dramatic change in the bank-firm relationship within our sample period. So, although our study 
also examines the bank-firm relationship, we focus on how this relationship affects the 
  3performance of banks through the governance structure determined by this relationship. 
It was recently discovered in the banking literature that it is the organizational and 
governance structure, not bank size, that matters in small-business lending (Takats, 2004; Peek 
and Rosengren, 1998). This suggests that the change in the organizational and governance 
structure of banks brought about by bank consolidation may be more important than the change 
in bank size, which was also a consequence of bank consolidation. The historical data we used 
in this paper has a unique feature in providing us with information on how the banks’ boards of 
directors were organized, in terms of their relationships with industrial companies, both before 
and after consolidation.
2 To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study on the impact of 
banking consolidation on the bank-firm relationship through the channel of governance 
structure of banks.   
  Another strand of the literature relating to our work is on relationship banking, or 
sometimes more narrowly called “related lending.” As summarized in La Porta, 
Lopez-de-DeSilanes and Zamarripa (2003), there are advantages and disadvantages to 
relationship banking (i.e. close ties between banks and firms). The “information view” focuses 
on the positive effect of relationship banking in overcoming asymmetric information problems 
between banks and business borrowers, especially in the early stages of economic development. 
Lamoreaux (1994), Aoki, Sheard, and Patrick (1994), Petersen and Rajan (1994), and Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001) provide empirical evidence supporting this view. The “looting view,” on the 
other hand, stresses that related lending may result in unsound loans to related firms and 
encourages interest groups to loot bank resources and direct them to their related borrowers in 
case the borrowers default. La Porta et al. (2003) showed an example of “looting” through 
                                                        
2 Data on director interlocking in 1926 was compiled and first explored in Okazaki, et al. 
(2005). Interlocking data used in this paper extended the old data set by including the 
number of interlocks in 1931 and 1936.   
  4related lending with loan data from Mexican banks during their financial distress of the 1990s. 
Also, using data on interlocking in Japanese banks in 1926, Okazaki et al. (2005) confirmed that 
director interlocks were harmful to the profitability of banks and increased the probability of 
bank runs and closures. 
Related to these prior works, in particular to Okazaki et al. (2005), we explore how 
this negative side of relationship banking changed over time in pre-war Japan. Interestingly, 
these negative effects diminished along with banking consolidation.
3  
  The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our data. Sections 3 to 5 
describe our empirical analysis on the impact of banking consolidation on organ bank 
relationships. Section 3 focuses on the quantitative decline of organ bank relationships 
accompanying bank failures and consolidations. Section 4 focuses on the effect of bank-firm 
relationships on bank performance and its change over time. And Section 5 provides a 
comparison between a sub-sample of consolidated banks and non-consolidated banks on both 
the quantity change and the quality change of their connections with non-banking firms. 
Conclusions and discussions are summarized in Section 6. 
 
2 Overview of Organ Bank Relationships and Banking Consolidations 
 
2.1 Data 
We focus on the interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking 
companies to measure the connection between them, following Okazaki et al. (2005). The data 
source for director interlocking is Ginko Kaisha Yoroku (Directory of the Banks and Firms) by 
                                                        
3 Other studies that document the negative effect of organ bank relationships in pre-war 
Japan include Kato (1957), Takahashi and Morigaki (1968), Teranishi (2000), Yamazaki 
(2000), and Okazaki et al. (2005), but these studies did not address the change of this 
effect of banking consolidation. 
 
  5Tokyo Koshinjo, one of Japan’s largest private credit bureaus.
4 We found the names of the 
directors and auditors of each bank and non-banking firm with a paid-in capital larger than 
¥200,000. As in Okazaki et al. (2005), if a person was a director at a certain bank and a director 
of a non-banking firm at the same time, we identified this as one interlock. If a person was a 
director at a certain bank and at the same time served as a director for two non-banking firms, 
we identified two interlocks. As we were interested in how the organ bank relationship was 
affected by structural changes in the late 1920s and early 1930s, we compiled data on 
interlocking in 1926, 1931, and 1936. 
We obtained financial data on each bank from Ginkokyoku Nenpo (Yearbook of the Bank 
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance), which covers all of the banks in Japan. We took banks 
commonly found in both sources, Ginko Kaisha Yoroku and Ginkokyoku Nenpo, as samples.
5 
The financial data in Ginkokyoku Nenpo was limited to balance-sheet data. Also, data on 
negative profits (losses) was censored.
6  
Ginko Jiko Geppo (Monthly Report Bank Issue), prepared by the Bank of Japan, exists 
as a data source. Using this source, we identified the cause of each exit: consolidation, 
bankruptcy, closure, dissolution, etc.
7 For each consolidation, we found information on the date 
of the event, the type of consolidation, and the locations of the headquarters, as well as 
information on the paid-in capital of the participants. The consolidation types fall into three 
categories: absorption, acquisition, and combination forming a new bank. The third type, 
                                                        
4Director positions include chairman, president, vice-president, executive director, ordinary director, 
and auditor. Some banks did not have senior director positions (chairman, president, vice-president, 
or executive director). 
5As the point of time covered in Ginko Kaisha Yoroku differs from that in Ginkokyoku Nenpo, we 
lost many observations in matching these sources, especially when consolidations and failures 
occurred frequently. Therefore, to keep as many sample observations as possible, we used the end 
value of 1926 and the beginning value of 1931 and 1936 (the end value of 1930 and 1935), with 
respect to Ginkokyoku Nenpo.          
6If a bank’s profit was negative, the negative value was not reported in this source. 
7 Ginko Jiko Geppo dose not carry information on all types of exits, other than consolidations before 
June 1930. Therefore we supplemented this information, using Goto (1968). 
  6combining into a new bank, was where a new bank was established after the dissolution all of 
the participants. According to  Kin’yu Kenkyukai (Research Committee of Financial Issues) 
(1934), in the cases where the participants were of nearly equal power, they tended to choose to 
combine into a new bank. So, in the following analysis, we define the third type of 
consolidation, a combination into a new bank, as a “merger of equals.” We define the first two 
types of consolidation, absorption and acquisition, as absorbing consolidations. All the other 
bank exits are categorized as bank failures.   
 
2.2 Basic Statistics 
Panel A in Table 1 shows basic statistics on director interlocking in 1926, 1931, and 
1936. We divided the banks into two groups, large banks and small banks. Large banks are those 
with assets of more than ¥10 million. The number of large banks decreased by about 25% 
between 1926 and 1936, while the number of small banks decreased by about 60%, implying 
that the share of small banks sharply declined in this period. With respect to all of the banks in 
the sample, the average number of interlocks per bank in 1926 was as large, at 7.26. This value 
gradually increased from 1926 to 1936. Looking at the small-bank and large-bank sub-samples, 
we found the average number of interlocks in small banks declined in this period, whereas it did 
not in the large banks. We observed a similar tendency with respect to the number of interlocks 
normalized by the total number of directors (the number of interlocks per director). On the other 
hand, the number of interlocks normalized by asset size (number of interlocks/asset) decreased 
in both large and small banks. In the end, we found that director interlocking with non-banking 
companies was attenuated in small banks in the late 1920s and early 1930s, while it was not in 
large  banks.    
  Panel B shows the composition of director interlocks by year. Using the positions of 
  7the directors involved in the bank and the non-banking company, we classified director 
interlocking into four types. Here, we focus on the positions of senior director and junior 
director. Senior director refers to the president, chairman, vice-president, and executive director. 
Junior director refers to an ordinary director and auditor. For example, in 1926, interlocks 
between the senior directors at banks and the senior directors at non-banking companies made 
up 5.2% of all interlocks. This composition of director interlocking did not vary substantially in 
1926, 1931, and 1936. Also, the composition did not differ considerably between large and 
small banks (not reported in the table). 
  Panel C shows basic statistics on the banking industry by year and bank size.
8 There 
was a sharp upward trend in the asset size of all banks from 1926 to 1936. The increase in bank 
size is mainly due to consolidations and failures among small banks. While profitability (ROA 
and ROE, or return on assets and return on equity, respectively)
9 decreased from 1926 to 1931, 
it improved slightly after that until 1936, basically reflecting changes in macroeconomic 
conditions.
10  
     
3  Bank Exits and the Presence of Director Interlocking 
 
3.1 Expected Effect of Bank Exits 
As stated above, many banks exited the industry through consolidations and failures in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s. We examined how director interlock affected the possibility of 
bank exits and investigated its implications. As the banks with director interlocking tended to 
exit from the industry with higher probability, the share of those banks with director 
                                                        
8 See appendix (definition of variables) for variable definitions. 
9 In calculating ROA and ROE, we used zero as the value of censored profits.   
10 The bottom year of the Great Depression in Japan was 1931. Japan returned to the gold standard in 
1930, accompanied by cutbacks in government spending and deflation. 
  8interlocking would decline. This effect is related to a change in the quantity of director 
interlocking. At the same time, bank exits might have had the effect of changing the quality of 
director interlocking (Okazaki, 2004). We detail this quality change in Section 4, where we 
show that director interlocking was negatively correlated with profitability in respect to small 
banks, but not with respect to large banks. Given this relationship, we inferred that if there was a 
higher probability of small banks with director interlocking exiting the industry, the average 
quality of director interlocking would improve. So, here we examine whether director 
interlocking increased the probability of exiting, especially with respect to small banks. 
 
3.2  Model 
We used data on the banks that operated in 1926 to examine how director interlocking 
between banks and non-banking companies affected the probability of bank exits in the period 
from 1927 to 1936. In this analysis, we refer to all types of exits, except consolidations, as 
failures, and we classify bank consolidations into absorbing consolidations and mergers of 
equals. The first classification includes absorptions and acquisitions in Ginko Jiko Geppo, and 
the second includes the combinations that became new banks. So, in our analysis there are three 
types of bank exits, categorized according to their cause: failures, absorbing consolidations, and 
mergers of equals. To capture the effect of director interlocking (as well as bank size) on the 
probability of bank exits, we estimate the following equation using a multi-nominal logit model.   
    
  Prob(EXITi) = F[β0 + β1*INTERLOCKi + β2*SIZEi + β3EQi +β4*CAPDEPOi  +  
β5*LIQUIDi + β6*ROEi ＋  β7*SECURITYi ]        
                                                               ( 1 )  
The dependent variable, EXIT, can take 4 values. It takes the value one, two, or three if a 
  9bank exited through a merger of equals, an absorbing consolidation, or a failure, respectively. It 
takes the value of zero if the bank survived through the end of 1936.  While independent 
variables are data from 1927 to 1936, the explanatory valuables are data from 1926. 
  In selecting the explanatory variables, we principally followed the literature on the 
determinant of bank failures and M&As (Focarelli et al. 2002; Wang, 2004; Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2000). INTERLOCK is the variable we used to capture the effect of the organ bank 
relationship
11. If banks with director interlocking tended to exit with higher probability, the 
expected INTERLOCK coefficient would be positive. We used two alternative INTERLOCK 
variables. One is the natural log value of the number of interlocks (LNINTERLOCK).
12 The 
other is the number of interlocks normalized by the number of directors (INTDIRC). SIZE, 
measured by the log value of banks’ total assets, is supposed to capture the risk of a bank
13. 
Since large banks can generally bear an economic or liquidity shock more easily through 
diversifying their asset or liability risk, compared to small banks, larger banks have a greater 
capability to endure shocks than smaller banks.  Smaller banks were more likely to be 
consolidated because their restructuring was more manageable to the banks acquiring them 
(Focarelli et al. 2002)
14, and also because the Bank Law of 1927 discouraged the existence of 
small banks, by prescribing a high minimum capital requirement. Therefore, we expected the 
SIZE coefficient to be negative. EQ is used to capture the effect of the Great Kanto Earthquake 
in 1923. It takes the value 1 if a bank’s headquarters was located in the areas damaged by this 
earthquake, i.e., Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba and Saitama prefectures. Several prior investigations 
pointed out that many banks in the south Kanto area suffered from bad loan problems as a result 
                                                        
11 In Wang (2004), INTERLOCK is used to capture the management efficiency of a bank. 
12 In actual estimations, we used the natural log value of one plus the number of interlocks. 
13 We used the value of total capital plus total deposits as total assets, because we could not 
get the complete value of the total assets of the banks from Ginkokyoku Nenpo. 
14 Actually, former research confirmed that bank size significantly correlated with the probability of 
being acquired (Focarelli et al. 2002; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; etc.).     
  10of Great Kanto Earthquake (Kato, 1957; Takahashi and Morigaki, 1968, etc.). Hence, we 
expected EQ to have a positive effect, at least, on the probability of failure.   
  The rest of the explanatory variables are financial ratios. These variables were chosen 
to capture the components of the CAMEL rating, which has become a standard guideline for the 
risk of bank failure (Wang, 2004; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000)
15. CAPDEPO, indicating the 
ratio of equity capital to total deposits (the inverse of LEVERAGE), was used to the capture 
capital adequacy of a bank. Low value for this variable indicates high risk
16. Therefore, we 
expected the sign of this variable to be negative. LIQUID was the variable for liquidity. It 
indicates the ratio of bank deposit reserves to total assets. If a bank had sufficient liquid assets, 
it was unlikely to face a run or closure, because it could accommodate the withdrawal demands 
of its depositors. Therefore, we expected LIQUID to have a negative effect on bank failures. We 
used ROE (return on equity as a variable indicating profitability, and expected ROE to have a 
negative effect on bank failures. Also, we expected ROE to have a negative effect on the 
probability of being consolidated, if the purpose of the bank consolidation was to transfer 
superior management skills from the acquirer banks to the target banks. Finally, we used 
SECURITY to capture asset quality. As stated in previous section, security holdings were 
considered to be relatively safe as compared to loans. Therefore, we expected SECURITY to be 
negatively associated with bank failures.   
 
3.3 Results   
The results are reported in Table 2. INTERLOCK refers to the log value of the number 
                                                        
15CAMEL: capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, liquidity. This rating 
system has been used by Federal Reserve banks in the United States.
16 It should be noted that, as is stated in Wang (2004), high CAPDEPO value may reflect a bank’s 
inability to collect deposits due to loss of credibility. In this case, CAPDEPO is expected to have a 
positive effect on bank failures. Therefore, it might be better to interpret the CAPDEPO coefficient 
as the net effect between capital adequacy and incredibility. 
  11of interlocks (LNINTERLOCK) in Panel A and the number of interlocks per director 
(INTDIRC) in Panel B. In each of the panels, model [1] shows the estimated result of equation 
(1) without the four financial ratio variables, while model [2] shows the result when we added 
the four financial ratios. With respect to all of the models, we tested the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives to check whether existence of each type of exit was irrelevant to the 
choice of the remaining two exit options.
17 For each type of exit, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the two remaining alternatives that were available to a bank are irrelevant, as 
indicated in the last row.  
  For Model [1] in the panel A of Table 2, all of the INTERLOCK coefficients are 
positive, but it is statistically significant only with respect to failure, which implies that the more 
interlocks a bank had, the more likely the bank was to fail. This is consistent with the view that 
banks with a strong connection to their related firms performed badly due to unsound loans and, 
consequently, were forced to exit the market through failure. The SIZE coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for all types of exits. This result indicates that exiting 
banks were smaller than the surviving banks. Furthermore, its magnitude for failure is especially 
large, which may reflect that bank size is strongly associated with risk. As was expected, EQ 
had positive effects on absorbing consolidations and failures, which indicates that banks 
damaged by the earthquake in 1923 were forced to exit from the market through absorptions and 
failures. In Model [2], where four financial ratios are added, we were also able to confirm the 
positive correlation between the probability of failure and the number of interlocks, but this 
correlation is slightly weaker. On the other hand, ROE had a strongly negative effect on the 
probability of failure. It is likely that ROE partially absorbed the effect of director interlocking, 
as we were able to show through analysis in the following section that the director interlocking 
                                                        
17 See Hausman and McFadden (1984) for details. 
  12indeed had a negative effect on ROE. However, it is notable here that director interlocking had 
two effects: directly increasing the probability of failure as well as indirectly lowering 
profitability. Other financial ratios had no significant effect on any type of exits. In panel B, we 
checked the result by replacing LNINTERLOCK with INTDIRC. We confirmed a positive 
correlation between the probability of failure and director interlocking in this alternative 
specification.  
  Finally we ran the same regressions, splitting the bank samples into small banks and 
large banks, as defined in Section 2. Table 3 shows the results for small banks, and Table 4 
shows the results for large banks. With respect to small banks, we have results similar to the 
full-sample regression. Namely, small banks with greater director interlocking failed at a higher 
frequency. However, with respect to large banks, we did not observe a significant correlation 
between director interlocking and the probability of failure
18. These results are consistent with 
the observation in Table 1. As we have seen, the average number of interlocks declined in small 
banks. That decline, at least in part, reflects the selection pressure that excluded the small banks 
with director interlocking. 
 
4. Effect of Director Interlocking on Profitability and Its Change Over time           
  In the previous section, we observed a decline in director interlocking between banks 
and non-banking companies in terms of quantity through bank exits. In this section, we focus on 
the change in quality of director interlocking along the banking consolidation wave. To capture 
the change in the nature of director interlocking between banks and non-banking firms over 
time, we focused on the effect of director interlocking on bank performance, which is measured 
                                                        
18 We eliminated EQ in our estimations of large banks (Table 4), because EQ always equals zero for 
all banks exiting through mergers of equals. 
  13by the return on equity (ROE).
19 We compared the effect of director interlocking on ROE for the 




  Our model of bank profitability is similar to the one used in Okazaki et al. (2005). 
Profitability is measured by ROE, and the factors affecting bank profitability include the loan 
quality, the intensity of the competition, the attitude toward risk, and economies of scale
20. The 
basic OLS regression equation to be estimated is as follows:       
ROE
 
i= β0 + β1*INTERLOCKi+β2*EQi ＋  β3*MARKETi + β4*SIZE i
+β5*SECURITYi＋β6*LEVERAGE i＋εi                         ( 2 )  
The dependent variable is the banks’ ROE. With respect to the explanatory variables, 
INTERLOCK is used to capture the organ bank relationship, as defined in the previous section. 
According to the literature on the organ bank relationship, the banks with stronger connections 
with non-banking companies devoted more funds through corrupt loans to them. Consistent 
with the literature, Okazaki et al. (2005) confirmed the negative effect of these variables on 
bank profitability, based on the data from 1926. On the other hand, for this paper, we were 
interested in how this negative effect changed over time.     
The EQ and SIZE variables are the same as defined in Section 3, standing for earthquake 
                                                        
19 ROA is also considered to be an alternative measure. However, as mentioned before, we could not 
get the complete value of the total assets of the banks from Ginkokyoku Nenpo. Therefore, we 
focused on ROE here. But we also estimated ROA, calculated using incomplete total assets (total 
capital + total deposits), and we confirmed that the result was not qualitatively different than that of 
ROE.  
20 There are many studies on the determinants of bank profitability that propose various models, 
according to the specific problems the authors were analyzing. However, most of the literature 
considers three factors to be important determinants of bank profitability: economies of scale, the 
level of external competition, and the attitude toward risk (Smirlock, 1985; Bourke, 1989; Berger, 
1995, Goddard et al. 2001, 2004). In addition to these factors, Okazaki et al. (2005) included the 
variable of director interlocking between banks and firms to test the organ bank hypothesis.     
  14dummy and total asset log, respectively. We included SIZE here to capture economies of scales. 
We used MARKET as a proxy for the extent of market competition
21. It indicates the market 
share of the top three banks in a prefecture, in terms of the number of branch offices
22. 
The SECURITY and LEVERAGE variables control for a bank’s risk. If a bank is strongly 
risk-averse with a high proportion of safe assets in its portfolio, it is unlikely to earn high profits, 
but is also unlikely to be exposed to risk. We used SECURITY as the ratio of security holdings 
to the total loans
23. Here, we assumed that securities were relatively safe assets, since they were 
mainly government bonds and debentures of major companies
24. However, the sign of this 
coefficient is not clear a priori, because it depends on the relative average returns on the loans 
and securities. As corporate performance generally slowed in this period, it was especially 
possible that the profit at a bank holding more safe assets would be higher than the profits of a 
bank holding more risky assets
25. LEVERAGE, which indicates a bank’s financial leverage, is 
used to control for the effect of a bank’s capital structure, following Modigliani and Miller’s 
proposition￿
26. M&M’s proposition￿states that the expected return on equity increases along 
with financial leverage. In addition to these control variables, we included area dummies, given 
that some regional economic shocks were observed in the 1920s and 1930s, although this is not 
reported in the tables
27. 
                                                        
21 In the following analysis, we classified a prefecture as a separate market. 
22 Unfortunately, we could not access information on individual loan and deposit amounts by 
prefecture, with respect to banks operating in multiple prefectures. We got similar results when we 
replaced the share of the top three banks with the share of the top single  bank.      
23 In Okazaki et al. (2005), SECURITY was defined as the ratio of security holdings to assets. 
However, based on data from 1931 and 1936, this ratio highly correlated with SIZE (ρ=0.454 and 
0.508). On the other hand, the correlation between the ratio of security holdings to total loans and 
SIZE is not high (ρ  = 0.188 and 0.277). Therefore, we used this ratio as the definition of 
SECURITY. 
24 Imuta (2002) confirmed that stocks accounted for only 10.9% of total security holdings on average, 
with respect to 60 banks whose data for 1925 was available. 
25 Actually, Okazaki et al. (2005) confirmed that SECURITY had a positive sign, and its magnitude 
was larger, especially in small banks.     
26 See Brealey and Myers (2002), Chapter 17. 
27 We split the whole country into nine areas: Hokkaido/Tohoku, North-Kanto, South-Kanto, 
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4.2 Results   
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. Panel A indicates the results for 1926. In 
columns 1 and 2, the natural log value of the number of interlocks, LNINTERLOCK, is used as 
INTERLOCK. In column 3 and 4, the number of interlocks per director, INTDIRC, is used as 
INTERLOCK. According to the results, director interlocking had a strongly negative effect on 
bank profitability, which implies that the connection between banks and non-banking companies 
was unfavorable for bank profitability, as the literature on the organ bank relationship has 
pointed out. With respect to the other variables, the SIZE coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, which implies that large banks benefited from economies of scale. EQ is negative 
and statistically significant. We can infer that banks damaged by the big earthquake in 1923 
suffered from a problem with bad loans. We also found that, as the standard oligopoly theory 
predicts, banks in highly concentrated markets were relatively profitable. Finally, the banks’ 
asset portfolios did not have a significant effect on profitability. These results are generally 
consistent with those of Okazaki et al. (2005)
28. 
The results for 1931 are reported in Panel B. In column 1, the INTERLOCK 
coefficients are still negative and statistically significant. Although the absolute values of the 
coefficients are smaller than they were in 1926, the difference is not large. Also, the SIZE 
coefficient is still positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient is slightly larger than 
it was in 1926. Furthermore, the negative effect of the earthquake dummy (EQ) is still negative 
and statistically significant. 
Panel C presents the results for 1936. According to column 1, the INTERLOCK 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Chubu/Hokuriku, Tokai, Osaka/ Hyogo, other Kansai, Chugoku/Shikoku and Kyushu/Okinawa. 
Please note that the South-Kanto dummy is identical to the earthquake dummy, EQ.         
28 One exception is that the positive effect of SECURITY is attenuated compared to that in Okazaki 
et al. (2005). This may be because we changed the definition of SECURITY. See footnote 23.    
  16coefficient is still negative. However, the statistical significance of the coefficient declines to 
10%, and the magnitude is 40% smaller than that in 1926. On the other hand, SIZE still has a 
strongly positive effect on profitability, which implies that economy of scale was stable in the 
period from 1926 to 1936. With respect to EQ, the negative effect is no longer observed in 1936, 
because the Japanese banking system had recovered from the damage of the earthquake by that 
year. 
We then checked other specifications. In column 2 of Panels A-C, including 
LEVERAGE, we confirmed the results with those of column 1. Namely, the negative effect of 
INTRERLOCK observed in 1926 and 1931 is attenuated in 1936. On the other hand, the 
positive effect of SIZE weakened in 1926 and 1936 compared with column 1. We considered 
this to reflect that LEVERAGE was highly correlated with SIZE in 1926 and 1936 (ρ=0.487, 
0.527)
29. Actually, the positive effect of LEVERAGE is especially bigger in 1926 and 1931. 
Hence, the LAVERAGE coefficient is considered to partially capture the effect of SIZE. 
Columns 3 and 4 confirm that the negative effect of INTERLOCK was remarkably attenuated 
from 1926 to 1936. The INTERLOCK coefficient is no longer statistically significant, and its 
magnitude is substantially smaller in 1936. 
Meanwhile, Okazaki et al. (2005) pointed out that in 1926 the effect of director 
interlocking on bank performance depended on bank size. That is, with respect to small banks, 
director interlocking had a negative effect on bank performance, whereas it did not with respect 
to large banks. Hence, we estimated equation (2) by bank size (small banks and large banks). 
The results are reported in Table 6. Panels A, B, and C report the results for 1926, 1931, and 
1936, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 in each panel show the results for small banks, and 
columns 3 and 4 show those for large banks. And, we used LNINTERLOCK in column 1 and 3, 
                                                        
29 On the other hand, the correlation between LEVERAGE and SIZE is not high in 1931 (ρ=0.285). 
  17and INTDIRC in column 2 and 4, as the INTERLOCK variable. In columns 1 and 2 in Panel A, 
we confirmed that director interlocking was harmful to small banks. As we show in columns 1 
and 2 in Panels B and C, the coefficient for director interlocking at small banks is still negative 
and statistically significant in 1931 and 1936. Also, the absolute value of the INTERLOCK 
coefficient did not decline when we used INTDIRC as INTERLOCK
30. On the other hand, with 
respect to large banks (columns 3 and 4), the nature of director interlocking was not bad in 
general. 
The results of these sub-sample regressions suggest that the improvement in the quality 
of director, confirmed by the full sample regressions, mainly reflects a change in the scale 
distribution of banks. That is, the decrease in the number of small banks, which had bad 
relationships with non-banking companies, led to improvement in the average quality of director 
interlocking. 
 
5    Effect of Banking Consolidation on Director Interlocks Using a Sub-sample 
 
5.1 Expected Effect of Bank Consolidations   
  A bank consolidation is potentially expected to change the governance structures of 
the participating banks through the change of ownership structure and, hence, the change in the 
board of directors. As a matter of fact, Shiratori (2001) pointed out that one of the aims of the 
consolidation promotion policy in the 1920s in Japan was to remove unsound relationships 
between banks and industrial companies. Specifically, the government recognized that if a small 
bank was acquired by a large bank and became a branch of the acquiring bank, that unsound 
                                                        
30 We also conducted the same regression, including the LEVERAGE variable. The results were 
generally similar to those in Table 6. However, the effect of SIZE weakened in 1926 and 1936, as 
seen in Table 5.   
  18loans to related companies would be reduced through the discipline of the acquiring bank
31. 
Even a merger of equals was likely to improve the relationship with industrial companies, 
because each participating bank did not want the new bank to take over the other participant’s 
unsound relationships. Therefore, first we expected that number of director interlocks to decline 
through consolidations. Second, we expected that quality of director interlocking would 
improve, in the sense that its negative effect became weaker. In the rest of this section, we 
examine these expectations.   
 
5.2 Sub-sample of Consolidated and Non-consolidated Banks 
  To examine the effect of the bank consolidation on director interlocking, we used the 
consolidation samples in the period, from January 1927 to December 1929, when bank 
consolidations increased sharply. Then, we compared how the quality of director interlocking 
changed through the consolidations, by comparing the changes in the INTERLOCK coefficient 
in equation (2), from 1926 to 1931, between consolidated banks and non-consolidated banks.
32    
The source of the consolidation data is Ginko Jiko Geppo ( Monthly Bank Affairs), 
described in the previous section. We could not use all of the consolidations as samples for two 
reasons. The first was the availability of data on interlocking. As Ginko Kaisha Yoroku, the data 
source for interlocks, does not contain information on banks and non-banking firms with paid-in 
capital of less than ¥200,000, we needed to exclude the consolidations in which the paid-in 
capital of at least one participant was less than ¥200,000. The second reason was that in order to 
capture clearly the effects of consolidations in the sample period, we eliminated the effects of 
                                                        
31 Stein (2002) proposed the theory that a decentralized organization had an advantage in 
transactions associated with soft information as compared to a hierarchical organization. Given that 
related lending was based on soft, corrupt relationships between banks and business groups, 
according to Stein’s model, bank consolidation could reduce such related loans.             
32 If we use 1936 as the post-consolidation year, we lose many consolidation samples.   
  19consolidations that occurred one year before or one year after the sample period. Namely, we 
excluded those consolidations where at least one participant took part in another consolidation 
in either 1926 or 1930. After these procedures, 69 consolidation events involving 172 
participants were left to us. As the control sample, we selected those banks that did not 
participate in any consolidation in the period from 1926 to 1930. 
Table 7 shows the number of consolidation samples and the control sample we arrived at 
in this way. The consolidation participants are classified into four categories, by the type of the 
consolidation in which they were involved. Here, multi-time consolidation refers to 
consolidations where at least one bank experienced more than one consolidation in the sample 
period. For example, if Bank A merged with Bank B in 1927 and then acquired Bank C in 1929, 
we regard these two consolidations as one multi-time consolidation, where Bank A consolidated 
with Bank B and Bank C. Basic statistics by type of participants are shown in the Table 8.
33   
 
5.3  Results   
First, we compared the number of interlocks between the consolidation sample and the 
control sample (Table 9).  The 172 consolidated banks had 1,218 interlocks in the 
pre-consolidation year (1926), and 387 non-consolidated banks had 2,416 interlocks in the same 
year. On the other hand, in the post-consolidation year (1936), the number of interlocks came to 
814 and 1,913, respectively. The changes are -33.2% for the consolidated banks and -20.8% for 
the non-consolidated banks
34. As we expected, consolidations contributed to reducing director 
                                                        
33 In Table 8 and the following analysis, multi-time mergers are classified into mergers of equals if 
the last of the multiple consolidations was in the form of a combination into a new bank; they are 
classified as absorbing consolidations if the last consolidation was in the form of an acquisition or 
absorption. Using this classification, they were divided into 16 absorbing consolidations and 2 
mergers of equals.     
34 In calculating the change of interlocks in consolidated banks, we found some bank directors who 
held director positions in both banks to be consolidated. To avoid double counting, we used only the 
value of interlocks in one side of bank with respect to such directors.  
  20i n t e r l o c k s .                 
Next, we checked the effect of consolidations on the quality of director interlocking. The 
baseline of the following analyses is equation (2) in Section 4, but here we allowed the 
difference in the effects of director interlocking between consolidated banks and 
non-consolidated banks, in order to capture the effect of consolidation. Specifically, we used the 
consolidation dummy (CONS), with the value of one, if the bank participated in a consolidation, 
and a value of zero if otherwise. Then, we expressed the effect of director interlocking in the 
consolidated banks by the interaction terms of INTERLOCK and CONS. In the same way, the 
effect of director interlocking in non-consolidated banks is expressed by the interaction terms of 
INTERLOCK and (1-CONS).   
    The results are reported in Table 10. We used LNINTERLOCK as INTERLOCK in 
columns 1-2 and INTDIRC in columns 3-4. Column 1 indicates the results of the 
pre-consolidation year (1926). The coefficient of the interaction term of INTERLOCK and 
CONS was negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. Namely, director interlocking in 
consolidated banks was unfavorable to profitability in the pre-consolidation year. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of the interaction term of INTERLOCK and (1-CONS) was negative but 
not statistically significant. In addition, the absolute value of the coefficient was much smaller 
than that of the interaction term with CONS. These results suggest that, in the pre-consolidation 
year, director interlocking was unfavorable for consolidated banks, but was not so for the 
non-consolidated banks.   
     In to column 2, the coefficient of the interaction between INTERLOCK and CONS was 
still negative, but it was no longer statistically significant in the post-consolidation year (1931). 
Furthermore, its magnitude declined by 50%, compared with that in the pre-consolidation year 
(1926). This indicates that the quality of director interlocking in consolidated banks improved. 
  21On the other hand, the coefficient of director interlocking in non-consolidated banks was still 
negative and statistically insignificant. In addition, its absolute value was two times larger than 
that in the pre-consolidation year. Namely, the quality of director interlocking in the 
non-consolidated banks was not improved in the least.     
These results indicate that the consolidation had a positive effect on the nature of 
director interlocking. In column 3 and 4, where we replaced LNINTERLOCK with INTDIRC, 
we confirmed similar results, except for the CONS coefficient in the pre-consolidation year, the 
results were basically the same as those in columns 1-2. As the effect of the SIZE became 
greater, from the pre-consolidation year to the post-consolidation year, it might have affected the 
estimated results. Therefore, we ran the regressions, using the number of interlocks normalized 
by bank assets as INTERLOCK (not reported). In this case, the quality of director interlocking 
in the consolidated banks was improved, whereas it became worse in the non-consolidated 
banks. Furthermore, we had similar results in case including the LEVERAGE variable (not 
reported). 
          Next, we split CONS into three dummy variables by participant type in the consolidations, 
namely, ACQUIRER, TARGET, and EQUALS. ACQUIRER and TARGET are the dummy 
variables that indicate the bank was an acquirer and a target of the absorbing consolidation 
(absorptions or acquisitions, respectively). EQUALS is a dummy variable which indicates that 
the bank is a participant in a combination of a new bank. Then, we use these three dummy 
variables and their interaction terms with INTERLOCK.   
     The results are reported in Table 11. We used LNINTERLOCK in columns 1-2 and 
INTDIRC in columns 3-4 as INTERLOCK, respectively. In column 1, the INTERLOCK 
coefficient for the acquirer banks was negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. On the 
other hand, the INTERLOCK coefficient for the target banks was negative and statistically 
  22significant at a 1% level. Although the absolute value of the latter is larger than that of the 
former, the difference is not large. Therefore, in the pre-consolidation year, the quality of 
director interlocking was not favorable for either the acquirer banks or the target banks.   
        In column 2, which show the results of the post-consolidation year, the variables related to 
the target banks were excluded by definition, and the dummy variable ACQUIRER referred to 
the acquirer bank after absorbing the target bank. The coefficient of ACQUIRER*INTERLOCK 
is still negative and statistically significant. However, the negative correlation between director 
interlocking and profitability in the acquirer bank is attenuated, although it absorbed the target 
bank with unsound relationships with non-banking firms. Also, in columns 3 and 4 we 
confirmed similar results. Therefore, we can say that the absorbing consolidation had a positive 
effect on improving the quality of director interlocking. How did the improvement happen then? 
Considering the power balance between acquirer banks and target banks, it is reasonable to 
assume that the unsound relationships, at least in the target banks, were eliminated through 
consolidations. To confirm this assumption, we checked how director interlocking at the target 
bank was eliminated through the absorbing consolidation. We found that 91% of the directors at 
the target banks who had director positions in non-banking companies were eliminated from the 
post-consolidation banks, which means 92% of the total number of interlocking relationships in 
the target banks were terminated. This fact is consistent with our assumption. 
As for mergers of equals, the negative effect of director interlocking weakened according 
to columns 1 and 2. However, in columns 3 and 4, where INTDIRC was used as INTERLOCK, 
this effect was not observed at all. In this sense, we could not find strong evidence that mergers 
of equals had the effect of improving the quality of relationships between banks and firms.     
 
6 Concluding remarks 
  23In pre-war Japan, many banks were tied to non-banking companies through director 
interlocking, and the banks controlled by the non-banking companies, called “organ banks,” 
were a source of unsound loans, which is similar to lending in contemporary developing 
countries. In this paper, we examined how the organ bank relationship faded in the period from 
the late 1920s to the early 1930s. First, we confirmed that the number of interlocks per bank, as 
well as per director in small banks, declined in this period. One of the reasons is that, with 
respect to small banks, the number of interlocks positively affected the probability of bank 
failure. The other reason is that consolidations had an effect on reducing interlocks. Number of 
interlocks declined faster with respect to the banks that experienced consolidations. In addition 
to a decline in the number of interlocks, the quality of the interlocks changed at the same time. 
As consolidations selectively excluded interlocks of unsound quality, the average quality of the 
interlocks improved. We confirmed that the absolute value and statistical significance of the 
coefficient of the interlock variable in the ROE regressions declined over time, and that this 
change was observed only in the banks that experienced consolidations. 
  A close bank-firm relationship is not unique to pre-war Japan. Lamoreaux (1994) 
made clear that “insider lending” was pervasive in New England in the 19th century. La Porta, 
et al. (2003) studied “related lending” in contemporary Mexico and pointed out that such related 
lending behavior is widely observed in contemporary developing countries.
35 This paper is the 
first attempt to see how this relationship changed over time and what mechanisms worked to 
promote the change, using a unique dataset on bank-level director interlocking in pre-war Japan. 
Our findings suggest that banking consolidation and selection through failures may help 
eliminate the detrimental connections between banks and non-bank firms. 
                                                        
35 Further literatures include Maurer and Haber (2004) who investigated related lending in Mexico 
from 1880-1913, Laeven (2001) and Charumilind et al. (2003) who studied the cases for Russia and 
Thailand in the 1990s, respectively.     
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  30Table 1. Sample description
PanelA: Characteristics of  director interlocking
Year 1926 1931 1936
Variables/Bank size Total Large Small Total Large Small Total Large Small
Number of interlocks Mean 7.26 20.06 5.02 7.83 21.45 4.58 8.04 19.94 4.13
Median 4.00 15.00 3.00 4.00 18.00 3.00 4.00 15.00 2.00
Number of directors Mean 8.57 10.71 8.20 8.90 10.97 8.40 8.59 9.65 8.24
Median 8.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 11.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 8.00
Ｎumber of interlocks per 
director
Mean 0.84 1.87 0.67 0.86 1.99 0.59 0.90 2.03 0.53
Median 0.50 1.65 0.38 0.50 1.58 0.36 0.44 1.68 0.29
Number of interlocks/ Asset 
size(million yen)
Mean 2.77 0.72 3.13 2.38 0.71 2.78 1.75 0.62 2.12
Median 1.29 0.51 1.64 1.04 0.51 1.36 0.77 0.37 1.04
Number of banks 1007 150 857  659 127 532  453 112 339
Number of banks with interlocks 836 147 689  539 126 413  374 109 265
(percentage)  83.0% 98.0% 80.4% 81.8% 99.2% 77.6% 82.6% 97.3% 78.2%
Panel B: Composition of director interlocking
Year 1926 1931 1936
Director in non-banking company
Senior  Junior Senior  Junior Senior  Junior
(Bank Director)
Senior director  5.1% 22.4% 4.7% 22.1% 5.7% 22.2%
Junior director  10.8% 61.7% 11.7% 61.6% 15.6% 56.4%
Panel C: Basic statistics
1926 1931 1936
Variables/ Bank size Total Large Small Total Large Small Total Large Small
Assets(miliion yen) Mean 10.96 60.3 2.33 15.92 72.2 2.49 25.69 95.62 2.72
Std.dev. (47.53) (111) (2.01) (72.61) (153) (2.12) (119.8) (227.86) (2.14)
Total Loans/Total Deposits Mean 2.11 1.59 2.2 1.51 1.25 1.58 1.36 1.42 1.14
Std.dev. (11.13) (6.78) (11.72) (2.81) (3.06) (2.74) (4.12) (4.15) (0.34)
Equity Capitals/Total Deposits Mean 1.04 0.29 1.17 0.81 0.34 0.93 1.01 1.23 1.14
Std.dev. (7.06) (0.26) (7.65) (1.87) (0.59) (2.04) (5.11) (5.85) (4.03)
ROE Mean 13.28 13.84 13.18 7.94 8.96 7.7 8.97 10.27 8.54
Std.dev. (7.92) (7.82) (7.94) (6.45) (3.85) (6.91) (5.98) (5.28) (6.14)
ROA Mean 4.11 2.75 4.35 2.35 1.72 2.5 2.43 1.61 2.70
Std.dev. (3.2) (2.64) (3.23) (2.17) (1.06) (2.34) (1.99) (0.93) (2.17)
Security Holdings /Total Loans Mean 0.155 0.243 0.14 0.292 0.464 0.251 0.507 0.798 0.412
Std.dev. (0.298) (0.253) (0.303) (0.647) (0.34) (0.695) (0.699) (1.078) (0.482)
bank deposit reserve/Assets Mean 0.089 0.088 0.089 0.102 0.100 0.102 0.13 0.098 0.139
Std.dev. (0.077) (0.050) (0.804) (0.093) (0.700) (0.098) (0.094) (0.057) (0.101)Table 2. Determinants of type of exits in Prewar Japanese banking industry (all banks)
Panel A: LN(INTERLOCK)
[1] [2]










LN(INTERLOCK) 0.151 0.0178 0.3241 a 0.1674 0.0084 0.2414 b
(0.1164) (0.0998) (0.1085) (0.117) (0.0992) (0.1113)
SIZE -0.3277 a -0.4195 a -0.6234 a -0.3494 a -0.4233 a -0.4952 a
(0.0945) (0.0771) (0.0935) (0.1098) (0.08) (0.0936)
EQ -0.4554 0.6522 a 1.0485 a -0.3696 0.6477 b 0.8918 a
(0.3759) (0.2505) (0.2486) (0.383) (0.2546) (0.2638)
CAPDEP -0.2515 b -0.0036 0.0271
(0.1227) (0.0419) (0.0296)
LIQUID -1.1452 0.701 -2.3637
(1.1236) (1.0035) (1.566)
ROE 0 -0.0136 -0.0823 a
(0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0193)
SECURITY -1.0552 -0.0634 -0.296
(0.6953) (0.2365) (0.4114)
INTERCEPT 3.9416 a 5.9679 a 8.1952 a 4.6303 a 6.1783 a 7.7012 a
(1.2977) (1.059) (1.2677) (1.537) (1.1071) (1.2658)
NOB 1007 1007
Log Likelihood -1310.309 -1276.662
Pseudo 0.0375 0.0622
ＩＩＡ-test -0.56 3.11 -0.28 0.39 0.67 -2.65
Panel B: Number of Interlocks per director
[1] [2]










INTDIRC -0.026 0.0582 0.3568 a -0.0009 0.0525 0.3113 a
(0.1149) (0.0995) (0.0948) (0.1143) (0.0962) (0.0961)
SIZE -0.2501 a -0.4348 a -0.6188 a -0.2669 b -0.4427 a -0.5109 a
(0.0916) (0.0722) (0.0866) (0.107) (0.0744) (0.0864)
EQ -0.4635 0.6346 b 0.9187 a -0.382 0.6349 b 0.7878 a
(0.3775) (0.2524) (0.2502) (0.3845) (0.2563) (0.2625)
CAPDEP -0.2323 c -0.0062 0.023
(0.1208) (0.0341) (0.0222)
LIQUID -1.1223 0.695 -2.3767
(1.1614) (0.9986) (1.5336)
ROE -0.0015 -0.0133 -0.0821 a
(0.0106) (0.0107) (0.019)
SECURITY -1.0857 -0.0639 -0.3481
(0.721) (0.2422) (0.4224)
INTERCEPT 3.0523 b 6.1772 a 8.349 a 3.6868 b 6.4378 a 8.0671 a
(1.3107) (1.0339) (1.2234) (1.5515) (1.0762) (1.2269)
NOB 1007 1007
Log Likelihood -1307.358 -1274.027
Pseudo 0.0397 0.0642
ＩＩＡ-test -0.16 1.31 -1.08 1.75 -3.05 -3.54
Notes: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c", respectively. The figures in 
parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  Significance levels are reported for two-tailed 
tests. IIA-test reports the value of test on the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives property (Hausman 
and McFadden, 1984). Definition of variables can be found in appendix.Table 3.  Determinants of type of exits in Pre-war Japanese banking industry (small banks)
Panel A: LN(INTERLOCK)
[1] [2]










LN(INTERLOCK) 0.1178 0.019 0.3464 a 0.1424 0.0061 0.2638 b
(0.1266) (0.1062) (0.1163) (0.1276) (0.1054) (0.1206)
SIZE -0.4622 a -0.4114 a -0.6806 a -0.5637 a -0.411 a -0.4619 a
(0.1351) (0.1183) (0.1347) (0.157) (0.1219) (0.1416)
EQ -0.1156 0.4012 1.1761 a 0.0315 0.3867 1.0703 a
(0.3984) (0.2928) (0.2805) (0.4025) (0.3014) (0.3019)
CAPDEP -0.3695 b -0.0022 0.0197
(0.1472) (0.0254) (0.0174)
LIQUID -2.0895 c 0.0711 -3.1919 c
(1.2264) (1.0078) (1.6866)
ROE -0.0026 -0.0129 -0.0893 a
(0.01) (0.0116) (0.0205)
SECURITY -0.8013 0.0541 -0.6605
(0.6818) (0.2052) (0.6302)
INTERCEPT 5.8561 a 5.8999 a 8.9528 a 7.8326 a 6.0843 a 7.374 a
(1.8681) (1.6516) (1.8607) (2.1849) (1.6999) (1.9334)
NOB 857 857
Log Likelihood -1130.926 -1094.3022
Pseudo 0.0265 0.058
ＩＩＡ-test 3.56 1.04 -0.45 14.63 -0.50 -1.12
Panel B: Number of Interlocks per director
[1] [2]










INTDIRC 0.0506 0.1109 0.4454 a 0.0922 0.1048 0.4166 a
(0.1471) (0.1216) (0.1132) (0.148) (0.12) (0.1181)
SIZE -0.429 a -0.4375 a -0.6861 a -0.5248 a -0.4429 a -0.4855 a
(0.1302) (0.115) (0.1301) (0.1526) (0.1187) (0.1361)
EQ -0.1402 0.375 1.0219 a -0.0018 0.3654 0.9327 a
(0.4016) (0.2944) (0.2849) (0.4057) (0.302) (0.3049)
CAPDEP -0.3603 b -0.0047 0.017
(0.147) (0.0198) (0.0125)
LIQUID -2.0944 c 0.015 -3.307 b
(1.2476) (0.9946) (1.6502)
ROE -0.0037 -0.0124 -0.089 a
(0.01) (0.0115) (0.0204)
SECURITY -0.831 0.0462 -0.7484
(0.7031) (0.2173) (0.561)
INTERCEPT 5.5107 a 6.2374 a 9.2277 a 7.4306 a 6.4925 a 7.8325 a
(1.8443) (1.6353) (1.8374) (2.1685) (1.6882) (1.9048)
NOB 857 857
Log Likelihood -1127.1989 -1090.2144
Pseudo 0.0297 0.0615
ＩＩＡ-test 2.76 0.15 -0.45 5.86 1.08 -0.69
Notes: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c", respectively. The figures in 
parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. 
IIA-test reports the value of test on the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives property (Hausman and 
McFadden, 1984). Definitions of variables can be found in Appendix.  
Table 4. Determinants of type of exits in Prewar Japanese banking industry (large banks)
Panel A: LN(INTERLOCK)
[1] [2]










LN(INTERLOCK) 0.3662 0.0019 0.0636 0.4411 0.0896 0.1063
(0.3162) (0.3251) (0.3139) (0.339) (0.301) (0.3358)
SIZE -0.5084 -0.2683 -0.2828 -0.3794 -0.107 -0.2986
(0.3095) (0.2793) (0.2766) (0.287) (0.283) (0.3138)
CAPDEP 0.0832 -2.9449 c 1.3666 c
(0.8082) (1.7218) (0.813)
LIQUID 10.7774 b 12.024 b 7.5564
(5.1089) (5.3376) (5.4765)
ROE 0.0089 -0.0634 -0.0228
(0.0278) (0.0461) (0.0401)
SECURITY -3.4657 c -7.2836 a 0.9775
(1.9866) (2.0958) (0.6272)
INTERCEPT 6.5676 3.4695 3.3773 3.8017 2.3466 2.4839
(4.8912) (4.3801) (4.4605) (4.7723) (4.6986) (5.328)
NOB 150 150
Log Likelihood -179.29038 -162.41772
Pseudo 0.0123 0.1053
ＩＩＡ-test -0.01 -0.24 0.04 1.07 0.62 -8.98
Panel B: Number of Interlocks per director
[1] [2]










INTDIRC -0.2354 0.0827 0.0328 -0.1876 0.1642 0.0819
(0.195) (0.1955) (0.2013) (0.2055) (0.2111) (0.2109)
SIZE -0.2402 -0.3206 -0.2793 -0.1182 -0.1636 -0.3072
(0.3031) (0.2843) (0.2764) (0.2861) (0.29) (0.3094)
CAPDEP 0.2361 -2.9249 c 1.358 c
(0.783) (1.6865) (0.7985)
LIQUID 8.9404 c 12.4046 b 7.5747
(5.2243) (5.3654) (5.567)
ROE 0.0079 -0.0587 -0.0221
(0.0277) (0.0427) (0.039)
SECURITY -3.7615 c -7.3652 a 0.9925
(1.9741) (2.1801) (0.6273)
INTERCEPT 3.386 4.2162 3.4299 c 1.056 3.1618 2.7544
(5.0342) (4.6828) (4.6066) (4.9409) (4.9094) (5.4192)
NOB 150 150
Log Likelihood -179.20565 -162.46878
Pseudo 0.0128 0.105
ＩＩＡ-test -0.01 0.18 -0.10 -2.56 -0.09 3.37
Notes: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c", respectively. The figures in 
parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. 
IIA-test reports the value of test on the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives property (Hausman and 
McFadden, 1984). Definition of variables can be found in Appendix.Table 5. Effect of director interlocking on bank profitability
PanelA: Year 1926
Dependent Variable ROE
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIRC
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERLOCK -1.1852 a -0.9959 a -0.8087 a -0.7541 a
(0.3361) (0.3335) (0.2949) (0.2705)
SIZE 1.1844 a 0.4505 c 0.9497 a 0.2599
(0.2454) (0.2652) (0.2287) (0.2417)
EQ -3.0715 a -3.5748 a -2.7208 a -3.2713 a
(0.9063) (0.8839) (0.9087) (0.8873)
MARKET 0.0508 c 0.0389 0.0481 0.0361
(0.0296) (0.0272) (0.0295) (0.027)
SECURITY 1.5287 1.5084 1.646 1.6118 c
(1.011) (0.9705) (1.0021) (0.9554)
LEVERAGE 0.6937 a 0.7178 a
(0.1556) (0.1551)
INTERCEPT -3.6472 5.5166 -1.4092 7.3098 b
(3.5392) (3.5932) (3.4571) (3.4405)
Log Likelihood -3397.137 -3376.7 -3400.32 -3378.36
NOB 1007 1007 1007 1007
Censored Observation 64 64 64 64
Panel B: Year 1931
Dependent Variable ROE
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIRC
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERLOCK -0.9548 a -0.9099 a -0.7265 a -0.6967 b
(0.3445) (0.3395) (0.2719) (0.2696)
SIZE 1.3961 a 1.1063 a 1.2603 a 0.9776 a
(0.2949) (0.2814) (0.2665) (0.2547)
EQ -2.396 b -2.6749 a -1.9927 b -2.2889 b
(0.9766) (0.9905) (0.9436) (0.9527)
MARKET 0.0024 0.0027 -0.002 -0.0015
(0.02) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0199)
SECURITY 0.1697 0.1482 0.1612 0.1406
(0.4981) (0.4807) (0.5132) (0.4944)
LEVERAGE 0.257 a 0.2584 a
(0.0408) (0.0402)
INTERCEPT -11.8607 a -8.2417 b -10.6643 a -7.1115 b
(3.7532) (3.6027) (3.5229) (3.3804)
Log Likelihood -2008.167 -1995.11 -2009.39 -1996.24
NOB 659 659 659 659
Censored Observation 92 92 92 92
Panel C:Year 1936
Dependent Variable ROE
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIRC
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERLOCK -0.6987 c -0.5882 c -0.2437 -0.3519
(0.3943) (0.3527) (0.5753) (0.3331)
SIZE 1.2199 a 0.4312 1.01 a 0.3013
(0.2509) (0.2764) (0.2801) (0.2708)
EQ 1.3931 0.3319 1.5933 c 0.5465
(1.0342) (0.8941) (0.9191) (0.8677)
MARKET -0.0375 c -0.0329 -0.0382 c -0.034
(0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0214)
SECURITY 1.7315 b 1.5072 b 1.7143 b 1.5229 b
(0.8157) (0.6826) (0.8305) (0.6794)
LEVERAGE 0.5666 a 0.5787 a
(0.1366) (0.1416)
INTERCEPT -9.2026 b 1.116 -7.0121 c 2.3692
(3.5486) (3.6995) (3.9574) (3.7127)
Log Likelihood -1365.33 -1343.33 -1366.93 -1344.14
NOB 453 453 453 453
Censored Observation 46 46 46 46
Notes: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c", respectively. 
The figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  7 area 
dummies are included. Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests.)
)
)
Table 6. Effect of director interlocking on bank profitability by bank size
PanelA: Year 1926
Dependent Variable ROE
Bank Size Small banks Large banks
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK INTDIRC LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIRC
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERLOCK -1.3368 a -0.8622 b 0.1483 -0.2348
(0.3584) (0.3376) (0.9197) (0.6348)
SIZE 1.9452 a 1.6322 a -0.1975 0.0054
(0.4069) (0.396) (0.8356) (0.7841)
EQ -3.7282 a -3.3522 a 1.1645 1.1694
(1.0134) (1.0268) (2.2492) (2.1831)
MARKET 0.0603 b 0.0574 c 0.0476 0.0476
(0.0306) (0.0311) (0.0897) (0.0904)
SECURITY 1.863 c 1.9989 c -0.8223 -0.8454
(1.0933) (1.074) (1.0713) (1.0669)
INTERCEPT -14.2235 b -11.0431 c 14.0973 11.4547
(5.7592) (5.6795) (12.7275) (12.9044)
Log Likelihood -2875.095 -2879.683 -511.353 -511.282
NOB 857 857 150 150
Censored Observation 61 61 3 3
Panel B: Year 1931
Dependent Variable ROE
Bank Size Small banks Large banks
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK INTDIRC LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIRC
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERLOCK -0.9314 b -0.8638 b -0.8136 -0.4961 c
(0.3817) (0.3989) (0.5159) (0.2558)
SIZE 2.0842 a 1.9388 a 1.1104 b 1.1138 b
(0.5556) (0.5335) (0.4589) (0.4364)
EQ -2.7546 b -2.3646 b -1.7895 -1.489
(1.2083) (1.1736) (1.6002) (1.5128)
MARKET -0.0015 -0.0049 0.0276 0.0247
(0.0264) (0.0266) (0.0217) (0.022)
SECURITY 0.1011 0.1136 0.2807 0.4126
(0.5122) (0.5353) (0.8932) (0.8972)
INTERCEPT -21.5161 a -20.0841 a -8.7364 -10.1724
(7.4901) (7.293) (6.523) (6.8085)
Log Likelihood -1627.155 1628.152 -337.328 -336.777
NOB 532 532 127 127
Censored Observation 86 86 6 6
Panel C:Year 1936
Dependent Variable ROE
Bank Size Small banks Large banks
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK INTDIRC LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIRC
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERLOCK -0.7979 c -0.9128 c 0.3049 0.6372
(0.435) (0.5173) (0.814) (0.7775)
SIZE 1.9589 a 1.8782 a 0.6343 0.4768
(0.535) (0.5198) (0.6664) (0.6683)
EQ 0.2159 0.413 3.1791 2.4087
(1.0148) (1.0039) (2.1866) (1.5503)
MARKET -0.0393 -0.0405 0.0092 0.0133
(0.0274) (0.0272) (0.029) (0.0301)
SECURITY 3.1819 a 3.2158 a 0.84 c 0.6861
(0.9741) (0.9829) (0.4375) (0.495)
INTERCEPT -20.0308 a -19.4359 b -3.8687 -1.5341
(7.6638) (7.5546) (10.0294) (10.622)
Log Likelihood -1017.76 -1018.087 -332.7052 -331.326
NOB 341 341 112 112
Censored Observation 41 41 5 5
Notes: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c", respectively. The 
figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  7 area dummies are 
included. Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests.Table 7.　Observations of consolidation samples
Number of consolidation
Total 1927 1928 1929 Number of 
participating banks
(1) Consolidation
   Merger (absorption) 23 8 9 6 47
   Acquisition 11 2 7 2 22
   Combination into a new bank 17 5 7 5 42
   Multi-times merger 18 61
Total  consolidations 69 172
(2) Peer group (Non-consolidated) 387 387Table 8: Sample description about pre-merger banks
Panel A: Acquirer banks
Variable NOB Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Interlocks 50 11.44 12.33 0.00 63.00
Ｎumber of interlocks per director 50 1.21 1.24 0.00 5.25
ROE 50 13.65 4.46 1.47 23.96
ROA 50 3.50 2.05 0.10 9.64
Assets(1000 yen) 50 36486.53 87244.54 761.16 475586.30
EQ 50 0.12 0.33 0 1
MARKET 50 32.16 15.41 11.31 63.64
SECURITY 50 0.26 0.39 0.01 2.73
Panel B: Target banks
Variable NOB Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Interlocks 74 6.04 7.60 0.00 34.00
Ｎumber of interlocks per director 74 0.70 0.90 0.00 4.20
ROE 74 12.38 7.10 0.00 47.62
ROA 74 4.32 5.12 0.00 40.37
Assets(1000 yen) 74 4968.41 11003.66 56.71 80121.54
EQ 74 0.11 0.31 0 1
MARKET 74 33.90 16.03 11.31 63.64
SECURITY 74 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.78
Panel C: Participants in mergers of equals (combination into a new bank)
Variable NOB Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Interlocks 48 5.75 5.48 0.00 27.00
Ｎumber of interlocks per director 48 0.74 0.72 0.00 3.38
ROE 48 14.62 5.91 0.00 30.06
ROA 48 4.54 2.01 0.00 9.02
Assets(1000 yen) 48 2170.54 1700.50 480.14 8722.22
EQ 48 0.00 0.00 0 0
MARKET 48 31.45 15.23 13.17 94.59
SECURITY 48 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.80
Panel D: Non-consolidated banks (Control samples)
Variable NOB Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Interlocks 387 6.24 8.47 0.00 66.00
Ｎumber of interlocks per director 387 0.79 0.97 0.00 5.60
ROE 387 13.63 7.50 0.00 63.26
ROA 387 4.42 3.21 0.00 28.43
Assets(1000 yen) 387 7029.58 39319.25 249.68 572070.10
EQ 387 0.13 0.34 0 1
MARKET 387 28.27 12.63 11.31 100.00
SECURITY 387 0.14 0.20 0.00 2.34Table 9. Change in number of interlocks from pre- to post-consolidation
Total number of interlocks
NOB 1926(pre-M&A) 1931(Post-M&A) Growth rate
(1) Total consolidation 69 1218 814 -33.2%
   Absorbing consolidation 50 997 683 -31.5%
Merger of equals 19 221 131 -40.7%
(2) Peer group (Non-consolidated) 387 2416 1913 -20.8%Table 10. Effect of consolidation on the nature of bank governance
Panel A: Ln(Number of Interlocks)
Dependent Variable ROE
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIC
Year 1926 1931 1926 1931
(Pre-merger) (Post-merger) (Pre-merger) (Post-merger)
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
CONS  2.8098 b 0.9443 1.145 -0.3292
(1.2841) (1.4334) (0.8773) (1.0204)
CONS*INTERLOCK -2.3426 a -1.1678 c -2.1131 a -0.5092
(0.5588) (0.638) (0.4953) (0.4721)
(1-CONS)*INTERLOCK -0.2769 -0.6343 -0.2155 -0.7202 c
(0.4582) (0.4308) (0.4924) (0.4318)
SIZE 0.694 b 1.3743 a 0.566 c 1.2883 a
(0.3201) (0.3774) (0.3002) (0.3561)
EQ -2.7088 b -3.0789 b -2.4693 c -2.8032 b
(1.3211) (1.2519) (1.3248) (1.2189)
MARKET -0.0029 0.0045 -0.0055 0.0019
(0.0289) (0.0234) (0.0289) (0.0233)
SECURITY 2.6362 b 0.0868 2.6384 b 0.1
(1.2686) (0.5221) (1.3269) (0.5397)
INTERCEPT 3.7376 -11.5482 b 5.3795 -10.6207 b
(4.4525) (5.0325) (4.3433) (4.8408)
Log Likelihood -1844.965 -364.508 -1846.87 -1364.99
NOB 559 456 559 456
Censored Observation 20 71 20 71
Notes: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c", respectively. The 
figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  7 area dummies are 
included. Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. Table 11. Effect of consolidation on the nature of bank governance by type of participants 
Dependent Variable ROE
Definition of INTERLOCK LN(INTERLOCK) INTDIC
Year 1926 1931 1926 1931
(Pre-merger) (Post-merger) (Pre-merger) (Post-merger)
Explanatory Variables/Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
ACQUIRER 3.2444 b 2.2611 c 1.6428 0.4559
(1.4747) (1.2567) (1.051) (1.0807)
ACQUIRER*INTERLOCK -2.3641 a -1.4346 b -2.195 a -0.5683
(0.6323) (0.5865) (0.6246) (0.4571)
TARGET 2.2248 0.4873
(1.9753) (1.3242)
TARGET*INTERLOCK -2.6444 a -2.5143 a
(0.906) (0.8797)
EQUALS 3.5927 c -1.4972 1.5837 -0.8301
(1.9176) (3.5155) (1.3409) (2.3657)
EQUALS*INTERLOCK -2.0271 c -0.667 -1.1638 -2.1719
(1.0709) (1.6955) (1.2075) (2.732)
(1-CONS)*INTERLOCK -0.2514 -0.6067 -0.1912 -0.6859
(0.4611) (0.4341) (0.4939) (0.4319)
SIZE 0.6587 b 1.3237 a 0.5248 c 1.2265 a
(0.3348) (0.385) (0.3122) (0.3569)
EQ -2.4943 c -3.1326 b -2.2895 c -2.8478 b
(1.3301) (1.2523) (1.3368) (1.2186)
MARKET 0.0021 0.0046 -0.0007 0.0019
(0.0288) (0.0234) (0.029) (0.0232)
SECURITY 2.569 b 0.0787 2.5726 c 0.0903
(1.2739) (0.5197) (1.3206) (0.5373)
INTERCEPT 4.0447 -10.8455 b 5.8212 -9.7439 b
(4.652) (5.1523) (4.5038) (4.8665)
Log Likelihood -1843.32 -1363.71 -1845.3 -1364.182
NOB 559 456 559 456
Censored Observation 20 71 20 71
Notes: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c", respectively. The 
figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  Seven area dummies are 
included. Significance levels are reported for two-tailed tests. Appendix: Definitions of the variables
Variables Definition
EXIT  Dummy variable that takes four  values. It equals 1, 2 and 3, if a bank exited by a 
merger of equals, an absorbing consolidation and a failure, respectively. It takes 
value zero if the bank survived through the end of 1936.
LN(INTERLOCK) Natural log value of number of interlocks. Number of interlocks means the total
number of the positions of directors and auditors of non-banking companies,
held by the directors and auditors of each bank.
INTDIRC Number of interlocks per director. That is, the number of interlocks divided by
the number of directors.
SIZE Natural log value of total deposit plus the book value of capital. Capital is the
sum of paid-in capital, reserved fund and profit 
EQ Dummy variable which equals 1, if the bank’s head office was located in Tokyo,
Kanagawa, Chiba, or Saitama prefecture, and 0, otherwise.  
MARKET Share of top three banks in term of the number of branch offices in each 
prefecture.
ROA Ratio of profit to total deposit plus the book value of capital. Profit is equal to
the profit of the second half of the fiscal year, multiplied by two.  
ROE Ratio of profit to the book value of capital. The profit is equal to the profit of the 
second half of the fiscal year, multiplied by two. Capital is the sum of paid-in
capital, reserved fund and profit 
LIQUID Ratio of bank deposit reserve to assets(total deposit plus the book value of 
capital) . Bank deposit reserve indicates the sum of cash holdings and deposit to 
BOJ and other banks.
CAPDEPO Ratio of the book value of capital to total deposits.  
SECURITY Ratio of security holdings to total loans
LEVERAGE Ratio of total deposits to the book value of capital. Capital is the sum of paid-in 
capital, reserved fund and profit 
CONS Dummy variable which takes the value one, if the bank participated in a 
consolidation, and zero otherwise.
ACQUIRER Dummy variable which takes the value one, if the bank was an acquirer in an 
absorbing consolidation, and zero otherwise.
TARGET Dummy variable which takes the value one, if the bank was a target in an 
absorbing consolidation, and zero otherwise.
EQUAL Dummy variable which takes the value one, if the bank was a participant in a 
combination into a new bank, and zero otherwise.